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1. Introduction 
 
Sellers of services and many goods have substantial discretion over quality after 
agreeing to trade because formal contracts cannot specify all details of the service to be 
performed.  In such environments, the parties’ perceptions of the agreement and relevant norms 
determine whether and how they respond to their necessarily-informal agreements.  As 
MacLeod (2007) points out, a key factor underpinning successful trading relationships is the 
extent to which there is a “mutual understanding of the events that determine contract breach”.  
Brandts, Charness, and Ellman (forthcoming) – hereafter BCE – found that 
communication plays a vital role in terms of contract selection, quality, and mutually-beneficial 
outcomes.  A primary feature of that study is the choice between two types of contract: flexible 
and rigid.  With flexible contracts, the buyer sets an initial price, which could be increased after 
the parties observe whether the seller suffers a cost shock; with rigid contracts, the initial price 
is automatically also the final price.  The process: the buyer chooses a contract form and a price; 
the seller can accept this proposal or reject it; in the latter case, the parties receive outside 
options.  Upon acceptance, all parties observe any cost shock.  The final price is then 
determined and made known, and the seller then chooses an unenforceable level of quality.  If 
there is free-form communication (chat), discussions can start before the contract is chosen and 
can continue after parties observe the cost shock and any subsequent price change. 
The focus of this article is to consider how behavior and outcomes differ according to 
whether the buyer chooses between the flexible and rigid contract options or whether the 
experimenter imposes the contract form, capturing the case of exogenous determination.  Both 
contract-determination procedures are found in the field: in some environments, traders choose 
their contract type, in others the contract type is fixed, perhaps by hierarchy or standard practice.  
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BCE and related works have focused on the endogenous setting.  This is reasonable given the 
many field environments where traders do have a choice.1 Nevertheless, a clean test of the 
relative performance of flexible and rigid contracts requires exogenous contracts, as it is entirely 
possible that different types of buyer choose different contract forms, coloring the results.  It is 
also possible that buyers react to the procedure of contract determination per se or that sellers 
respond differently to chosen than to assigned contract forms.  
Flexible contracts have the obvious advantage of allowing traders to adapt their actions 
to new circumstances: the buyer can adapt the final price to share the burden of the cost shock 
faced by the seller, and this voluntary sharing makes the seller more likely to cooperate.  
However, flexibility leaves room for ongoing disagreement over appropriate actions.  The risk 
of such costly disagreements led Hart and Moore (2008) to posit that quality may well be lower 
with flexible contracts.2  Indeed, without communication, there is rather modest support for this 
prediction.  By contrast, when the parties are able to engage in free-form communication, 
flexible contracts lead to much better outcomes than do rigid ones since communication enables 
them to establish an effective rapport and helps them to reach a mutual understanding on actions 
to be taken with and without the seller cost shock.   
A major contribution of this article is to consider the claim made in BCE that there is 
little difference in price, quality, and profits across endogenous and exogenous contracts.  We 
compare rigid and flexible contracts from each endogenous-contract treatment with the 
corresponding rigid and flexible contracts from (two) exogenous-contract treatments.  We do 
this for the environments both with and without chat, that is, we compare the two endogenous 																																																								1	It can also lower experimental costs since it typically reduces the number of sessions that need to be run.  	
2 For a more in-depth discussion of the issues relating to rigid and flexible contracts in the light of the theory in Hart 
and Moore (2008), interested readers should consult BCE and references therein.   
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treatments against the four exogenous treatments.  The results of the comparisons, both in the 
chat and no-communication settings, indicate limited selection and procedural effects:  buyers’ 
other actions and sellers’ responses are, with few exceptions, essentially the same, for each 
contract type whether that type was assigned or chosen. 
A second, perhaps greater, contribution is the attempt to evaluate when and how an 
experiment can be designed to reduce the need for running exogenously-imposed choices to deal 
with selection and procedural effects.  Policy-makers and economists are often interested in how 
a specific option (such as our contract type) affects the interaction between a set of actors.  This 
specific option may be imposed exogenously (by actors outside this interacting set) or 
determined endogenously by the actors or some subset of them; in our endogenous designs, the 
buyers choose the contract type (with sellers perhaps using voice to influence their choices in 
the chat treatments).  Given the much greater costs of having to run exogenous treatments even 
for field environments where the option is generally chosen endogenously, it is important to 
know whether this added expense is really needed.   
The general problem is as follows.  First, the alternative options, say there are two of 
them as with rigid and flexible, generate outcome variations independent of the procedure – 
endogenous or exogenous – that determined which option arises.  We call this the “instrumental 
variation” since it depends on the direct consequences of each option for an average individual; 
for instance, flexibility is an instrument for adaptation with ambiguity as a possible side-
consequence.  The difference between these instrumental effects is the key unknown of interest 
for field settings where the action is set exogenously, perhaps by a regulator or a hierarchical 
superior of the interacting set of parties, or effectively exogenous, as when the parties could 
choose the option but most of them simply follow a norm without thinking.   
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Second, endogenous determination of the options can matter to the actors per se and can 
moderate how each option affects outcomes.  These are valid effects of interest for field settings 
in which the options are endogenous. Process-dependent preferences and framing effects can 
directly affect actors’ behaviors.  For instance, endogeneity may lead the choosing actors to feel, 
and responding actors to deem them, more responsible.  We will argue that the relevance of this 
much-studied effect depends on whether the option discretion represents a substantial amount of 
the choosers’ overall discretion.  We call these direct procedural effects.  Other examples 
include (action-based) reciprocity, but note that reciprocity can arise indirectly via signaling and 
inference about the chooser’s characteristics (or “type”).  We call this latter case an instance of 
strategic procedural effects: endogenous choice reveals information to others, precisely because 
of the third effect.   
Third, selection effects arise when actors of different types choose both the option and 
other actions differently.  An important source of actor heterogeneity is in social preferences and 
this can distort apparent consequences of the choice of a given option, since social preferences 
are fairly stable.  For instance, if (and we will argue that designs can reduce this likelihood) 
generous types of buyer tend to pick flexible contracts than flexible contracts will be associated 
with another consequence of generosity: high transfers.  Such selection effects can be vital to 
understand field data with endogeneity, but the policy or strategy question requires controlling 
for selection effects, given that changing a policy design or strategy does not change the type of 
the actors involved.  
We care about the relative size of these three types of effect.  When the option of interest 
is a minor factor in the overall level of discretion of the relevant actors, and other direct 
procedural effects appear unimportant, it may be possible to design endogenous experimental 
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studies so as to limit the strength of selection effects (and corresponding strategic procedural 
effects). 
The remainder of this article proceeds as follows.  Section 2 offers a brief literature 
review and section 3 describes the experimental design and implementation.  The experimental 
results are presented in section 4, and section 5 provides some discussion and concludes. 
 
2. Related literature 
Given that the emphasis in Hart and Moore (2008) is on the relative performance of rigid 
contracts versus flexible contracts, it is rather surprising that there is so little research that 
conducts tests with contract forms that have been assigned rather than chosen.  Instead, the 
experimental literature on this topic has primarily considered endogenous contracts.  This could 
be problematic to the extent that selection and signaling effects may well be present.  Different 
types of people (here, buyers) may choose differently, and the choice of contract form may well 
reveal information (here, about buyers) that affects responses (here, by sellers).   
The first article in this area is Fehr, Hart and Zehnder (2009) – hereafter FHZ – which 
provides some evidence that flexibility can have negative consequences that may be attributed to 
ongoing disagreements.  In a context with (asymmetric) competition and ex-ante uncertainty 
over a potential shock to the seller’s cost, they find that buyers are better off choosing rigid 
contracts than by choosing flexible contracts.3  Rigid contracts generate a higher average profit 
																																																								
3 As summarized in BCE: Two potential buyers are matched with two potential sellers. Each seller has two units to 
sell and each buyer has a one-unit demand.  Each buyer determines a contract type (rigid or flexible) and the two 
sellers compete over price (an exogenous price interval prevents loss-making trades).  Then the seller cost shock is 
determined. If the contract is flexible, the buyer can respond by unilaterally increasing the price to be paid (subject 
to the no-loss upper bound).  After learning the final price, the seller trades exactly when the price covers cost (this 
seller behavior is actually imposed rather than “at will”).  If trading, the seller chooses between normal and low 
quality.  Choosing low is costly to the seller, but much more costly to the buyer.	
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for buyers, but seller profits are lower, resulting in little difference for total earnings.  Buyers 
choose rigid contracts 50 percent of the time.  
BCE avoids two less realistic features of FHZ.  First, FHZ only permit the seller to adjust 
quality downwards, excluding costly efforts that raise quality.  This exclusion is likely to favor 
rigid contracts because rigid contracts would otherwise suffer, relative to flexible ones, from the 
fact that they prevent buyers from using unexpected price increases to motivate costly effort.  
Second, FHZ do not allow trade after a cost shock though sellers may well wish to trade even at 
a loss if they deem the contract to be fair on average.  FHZ use this imposed no-trade choice (and 
a parallel imposed-trade choice) as a short-cut for studying the “at will” contracting environment 
where both parties can always opt out of trade.  BCE avoid this problem by studying the simpler 
case of specific-performance contracting. 
We also highlight another design simplification introduced by BCE – removal of the 
asymmetric competition stage of FHZ.  This proves most valuable for minimizing selection and 
strategic procedural effects that otherwise complicate an understanding of the basic rigid-flexible 
tradeoff.  
Our contribution here is to exploit the fact that BCE considered exogenously-determined 
contract types in addition to the endogenous case.  This feature permits both a clean test of the 
relative effectiveness of the two contract forms and a measure of the role played by selection and 
procedural effects in generating the results under endogenous contract type.   
To the best of our knowledge, the only other research on endogenous versus exogenous 
contract forms is Erlei and Reinhold (2012).  They note that sellers in FHZ have reason to blame 
buyers for selecting rigid contracts, since under rigidity, seller competition drives total price 
down to a minimum.  They replicate FHZ’s endogenous contracts, finding more low quality than 
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in FHZ, especially for rigid contracts, and buyers choose flexible contracts 72.3 percent of the 
time; buyer payoffs are higher for rigid but this difference is no longer significant.  They also 
conduct a new treatment in which contract types are exogenously determined by the 
experimenter.  While some might argue that this change in experimental design should not have 
an impact on behavior, they find that the new design results in a substantial change in behavior.  
The significant differences in subjects’ behavior in replicating sessions compared to that 
observed in the original study of FHZ indicates some robustness concerns, but the difference 
between the exogenous and endogenous design variants might suggest that exogenous treatments 
are vital.  Fortunately, our results here show that in our simpler design, the endogeneity-
exogeneity differences become very limited.4   
We attribute our more optimistic results to the design simplifications mentioned above 
and our removal of the asymmetric-competition feature.  Since our study has no seller 
competition obliging rigid contracts to be ungenerous (low price) as well as rigid (fixed price).  
That is, by removing the asymmetric competition of FHZ, we avoid tying up price rigidity and 
low prices.5  Isolating rigidity from the choice of price level separates rigidity and generosity so 
that picking rigid is no longer automatically ungenerous.  In this symmetric setting, we have no 
automatic reason to expect selection and strategic procedural effects, such as signaling.  Of 
course, in principle, subtler selection effects may still be present.  Our results reassuringly 
indicate that with suitable symmetry, endogenous designs are likely to be reliable. 
There is considerable evidence that choosing an action rather than having this action 
mandated affects the chooser’s behavior and the responses of others to the action.  In the field, 																																																								
4 Note that our design avoids mixing in a strategic effect of exogeneity, since there is no competitive process to 
oblige low transfers in the rigid contract. 5	In	most	field	settings,	fixed	prices	are	not	necessarily	low	prices;	indeed,	higher	prices	may	often	accompany	rigid	contracts	as	a	way	to	compensate	for	the	fact	that	they	imply	a	lack	of	insurance.	
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Levine and Tyson (1990), Bonin, Jones, and Putterman (1993), and Black and Lynch (2001) all 
show that worker participation (such as voice) in workplace decisions may positively affect 
productivity.6  Similarly, Bardhan (2000) finds that farmers are less likely to violate irrigation 
rules when they have chosen the rules.  Tyran and Feld (2006) and Ertan, Page, and Putterman 
(2010) provide experimental evidence that punishment and rewards have a stronger effect on 
behavior when the possibility of making these choices has been chosen democratically.  And yet, 
a major problem regarding the interpretation of the results in these papers is that one cannot rule 
out the possibility that when individuals or groups get to make more choices, different options in 
the sample are associated with different distributions of preferences than individuals or groups to 
whom a policy (“choice”) has been assigned and may affect the observed consequences of those 
choices.  
There are several experimental studies that address the problem of selection.  Dal Bó, 
Foster, and Putterman (2010) use a procedure that determines whether payoffs in a Prisoner’s 
Dilemma are modified to create a coordination game.  Participants first vote on whether to 
modify the payoffs.  A computer then chooses (randomly) whether these votes count: if they do, 
then the majority rules; if they do not, the computer chooses (again randomly) whether or not to 
modify the payoffs for that group.  The payoff modification impacts behavior more when it is 
chosen than when it is imposed.  The authors do find evidence of a selection effect, in that people 
voting to modify payoffs differ from those who voted against modification.  This design offers a 
																																																								
6 Voice (expressing one’s views) can play a part in one’s feelings about an outcome.  For example, Kitzmann and 
Emery (1993) find a much higher degree of satisfaction by fathers (with random assignment) in child-custody 
disputes when they participated in the process, even though they (almost) always lost.    Ellman and Pezanis-
Christou (2010) show that members of an organization feel more (morally) responsible for a harm caused by their 
organization when they had a more active role as participants in choosing the group action that initiated that harm.  
This identifies a direct procedural effect since the level of participation is exogenous.   
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neat solution for distinguishing categorical selection effects, but it does introduce a degree of 
complexity that may be problematic for subjects’ understanding. 
Sutter, Haigner, and Kocher (2010) vary whether a computer exogenously chooses the 
institution of punishment or reward in a public-goods game or the group itself chooses it through 
a voting procedure.  In the endogenous treatments, participants could determine the institution 
prevailing in their group by each voter indicating whether he or she was willing to accept this 
institution or not.  The vote was repeated until unanimity was achieved.  The results indicate that 
there is a positive direct procedural effect from a voluntary choice of a reward or punishment 
mechanism on the level of cooperation within groups, independent of which option is chosen. 
Corgnet, McCarter, and Hernan (2014) assign people to a setting in which the internet is 
turned off in the first part of the experiment, while people vote on whether to do so in the second 
part.  All but one group voted to turn off the internet, with production (at least for the subjects 
who used the Internet in the first half of the experiment) larger with voting.  Herbst, Konrad, and 
Morath (2014) compare behavior of individuals who self-select into teams to behavior in 
exogenously-formed teams.  They find that team choice leads to higher efforts than exogenous 
team assignment, even though, in their experiment, selection works against this effect in that 
types who provide high effort prefer to stand alone. 
Babcock, Bedard, Charness, Hartman, and Royer (2015) provide the cleanest result 
regarding choice, as there is virtually no selection effect possible since almost all subjects made 
the same choice (only 3 percent chose the team treatment).  They compared people who were 
assigned to an individual treatment and people who chose the individual treatment, finding that 
those people who made this choice registered a performance that was 27 percent higher than for 
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the assigned individual group.  This difference cannot be explained by selection since only three 
percent of the subjects chose an alternative team treatment rather than the individual one.7 
In view of the numerous studies showing that endogenous choice leads to greater 
cooperation and pro-social behavior, the expectation was that there would be less favorable 
results with exogenous imposition of the contract form.8  However, we shall see that this is not 
the case in BCE’s setting.  We interpret these results in two ways.  First, they suggest that when 
a choice of interest (here, the flexibility of contract form) is not intrinsically tied to a distributive 
position, then the design should seek to avoid features (such as asymmetric competitive 
positions) that interact with the focal choice to force distinct distributive implications.  This 
strategy limits the risk of selection effects.  It similarly limits strategic procedural effects based 
on signaling and inference.  Second, direct procedural effects of the act of choosing do not seem 
important in our context, because the buyer still has a significant amount of discretion in the 
exogenous treatments. 
 
3. Experimental design and implementation 
Here we borrow from BCE to describe the relevant treatments.  Participants play the 
same one-shot game in each of 10 periods (plus one practice period).  Across periods, they are 
re-matched and no two individuals ever play each other twice or observe another’s behavior in 
past periods (nor any average outcomes), so there is no way to build a personal reputation. Since 
the same game is played independently in each period, we can focus our analysis on the basic 
																																																								
7 This result stems from a required revision that initially seemed rather silly because one option was clearly 
dominated. There were two possible options: a team option in which both team members needed to reach a threshold 
for a reward to be generated, and an individual option that required this threshold for just that one individual (for the 
same reward).  
8 Of course, studies finding no difference may have been subject to the publication bias, and so are unobserved. 
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game, bearing in mind that subjects may learn how to play over time.9 
There were two treatments with endogenous choice of contract form, so that the buyer 
could choose to offer a rigid or flexible contract (with four sessions in each).  These consist of a 
no-communication treatment and a chat treatment. There were also four treatments (four sessions 
in each) with endogenous contract types (no communication and rigid contracts, no 
communication and flexible contracts, chat and rigid contracts, and chat and flexible contracts), 
These exogenous contract treatments serve to control for the possibility that selection or direct 
endogeneity effects drive results and here we focus on the comparison between the endogenous 
and exogenous results. 
3.1 Details and parameters of the basic game 
Sample instructions are presented in Appendix A.  The buyer can choose a contract type 
and a price P.  The seller then accepts or rejects the offer.  If no contract is accepted, the buyer 
and seller each receive outside option payments.  If the seller accepts a contract offer, the seller 
provides a good to the buyer.  The seller’s cost is subject to a shock, C, which both buyer and 
seller observe.  If a flexible contract was chosen, the buyer can augment the initial price P by any 
amount, which we denote by Q.  However, if a rigid contract was chosen at the initial stage, the 
initial price cannot be changed.  After observing Q, the seller chooses the good’s quality, x.	
Formally, buyer and seller respectively earn monetary payoffs of 5 + v(x) – P – Q and 5 + P + Q 
– C – ⎥ x⎥ if they trade and 5 each if not, where the buyer’s trade value v(x) = 10, 30, or 45, for x 
= -1, 0, +1, and C is either 0 or 20, with equal probability.	
																																																								9	As argued in BCE, the lack of repetition makes the analysis more relevant to one-shot interactions, such as when 
the buyer is a final consumer, rather than an employer or outsourcer, but as argued in MacLeod (2007), the 
behavioral enforcement of informal agreements that applies in one-shot interactions has strong parallels with 
repeated-game enforcement, so the results should have a broader relevance.	
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3.2 Timing 
The sequence of events for the treatments with exogenous contract is defined by the 
following five-stage game in which both parties observe the outcomes of all preceding stages:  
Stage 1: Buyer B sets the contract’s initial price offer P.  
Stage 2: Seller S accepts or rejects this offer. 
Stage 3: The computer randomly determines the seller’s base cost C at 0 or 20. 
Stage 4: If the contract is flexible, buyer B sets an additional transfer Q.  
Stage 5: Seller S sets the quality level, x = –1, x = 0 or x = 1. 
The sequence is the same with endogenous contracts, except that the buyer also chooses 
whether the (stage 1) offered contract is rigid or flexible. 
In the chat treatment, the buyer and seller can additionally engage in free-form 
communication, sending each other written messages, starting from the moment they are 
matched right up until the seller sets quality x in the final stage (stage 5).  
3.4 Implementation 
Sessions were conducted at the LINEEX laboratory (Valencia, Spain). Each session had 
groups of 22 people who played 10 periods (and a practice period); no one participated in more 
than one session. To eliminate income effects, one period was randomly selected for payment at 
the end of each session. Each payoff unit was worth 1€, and participants received an 8€ show-up 
fee. In the six treatments, we ran 24 sessions with 528 participants, with average earnings of 
about 17€ for no-communication sessions, and 25€ for chat sessions, which were respectively 
about 90 and 120 minutes in duration. 
Participant roles (buyer or seller) were fixed for the duration of their session and it was 
common information that no participants were ever matched together twice. Instructions and a 
careful explanation were read aloud at the start of each session. An always-available help screen 
enabled each participant to (privately) compute own and current partner payoffs from any set of 
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feasible choices he or she wishes to consider.  
 
4. Experimental results 
In this section, we first provide descriptive statistics and then non-parametric tests on the 
outcomes observed in our six treatments. We close with regression analysis of the differences 
across the relevant pairs of exogenous and endogenous contracts.  The main effects can be 
observed directly by looking at the treatment level data presented in Tables 1 and 2.  We refer 
the reader to BCE for a thorough analysis of the main conjectures in BCE and in particular the 
fact that all BCE’s principal results hold for both exogenous and endogenous variants.  A brief 
summary of those results is as follows: 
Ø Chat increases earnings and quality, especially for flexible contracts.  
Ø Chat sharply increases cost-sharing (Q) for flexible contracts. 
Ø Chat leads to a substantial advantage of flexible over rigid contracts. 
Ø Chat leads to a switch from rigid (slightly more frequent without communication) to 
flexible contracts (far more frequent with chat). 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 1 describes the contracts chosen, prices and transfers, rejections, quality levels, and 
earnings for the no-communication treatments, with endogenous and exogenous conditions in 
adjacent columns.  Table 2 presents the same information for the communication treatments.  
 Visual inspection shows few substantial differences across endogenous and exogenous 
conditions, so by and large the results with respect to quality and earnings are mainly the same.  
The only sizable difference for rigid contracts without communication is in the seller earnings, 
which are two-to-three units higher for exogenous contracts.  For flexible contracts without 
communication, exogenous contracts have a slightly lower rejection rate, a somewhat higher 
quality level, and seller earnings are once again two-to-three points higher.  The only real 
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difference for rigid contracts with chat across endogeneity is the slightly lower rejection rate for 
exogenous contracts.  For flexible contracts with chat and exogenous contracts, there is a little 
more cost-sharing (the increase in Q across cost-shock conditions), a slightly lower quality level, 
and seller earnings are about two points lower.   	
Table 1: Summary Statistics: No-communication Treatments 
Category 
Endo Rigid          
No Comm. 
Exo Rigid      
No Comm. 
Endo Flex      
No Comm. 
Exo Flex      
No Comm. 
Frequency* 243 (55.4%) 436 (100.0%) 196 (44.6%) 438 (100.0%) 
Rejections 79 (32.5%) 152 (34.9%) 65 (33.2%) 119 (27.2%) 
Average P (all offers) 13.28 [0.41] 13.91 [0.31] 11.59 [0.59] 12.44 [0.28] 
Average P (accepted offers) 15.74 [0.43] 16.28 [0.33] 13.25 [0.81] 14.21 [0.31] 
Average Q (with cost shock) -  - 3.35 [0.49] 4.18 [0.67] 
Average Q (with no cost shock) -  - 3.41 [1.85] 3.21 [0.37] 
Low quality (accepted offers) 51 (31.1%) 86 (30.3%) 53 (40.5%) 108 (33.9%) 
Normal quality (accepted offers) 107 (65.2%) 183 (64.4%) 74 (56.5%) 174 (54.5%) 
High quality (accepted offers) 6 (3.7%) 15 (5.3%) 4 (3.1%) 37 (11.6%) 
Avg. quality (accepted offers) -0.27 [0.04] -0.25 [0.03] -0.37 [0.05] -0.22 [0.04] 
Avg. buyer earnings (all offers) 10.80 [0.60] 10.51 [0.47] 8.84 [1.09] 10.16 [0.48] 
Avg. buyer earnings (accepted offers) 13.59 [0.77] 13.45 [0.65] 10.74 [1.61] 12.08 [0.62] 
Avg. seller earnings (all offers) 7.81 [0.59] 9.96 [0.48] 7.96 [1.22] 10.62 [0.57] 
Avg. seller earnings (accepted offers) 9.17 [0.86] 12.62 [0.68] 9.44 [1.81] 12.71 [0.75] 
Avg. total earnings (all offers) 18.61 [0.88] 20.47 [0.69] 16.80 [0.99] 20.78 [0.79] 
Avg. total earnings (accepted offers) 22.76 [1.18] 26.07 [0.90] 20.18 [1.40] 24.80 [0.99] 
No contract was offered on some occasions. P refers to the initial (pre-cost-shock) price, while Q refers to the 
transfer added with flexible contracts after the cost shock. Standard errors are in brackets. 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics: Chat Treatments 
Category 
Endo Rigid          
Comm. 
Exo Rigid      
Comm. 
Endo Flex      
Comm. 
Exo Flex      
Comm. 
Frequency* 111 (25.3%) 438 (100.0%) 327 (74.5%) 440 (100.0%) 
Rejections 20 (18.0%) 61 (13.9%) 12 (3.7%) 18 (4.1%) 
Average P (all offers) 22.76 [0.83] 23.04 [0.46] 16.92 [0.46] 13.14 [0.31] 
Average P (accepted offers) 25.22 [0.72] 25.38 [0.41] 17.22 [0.47] 13.47 [0.30] 
Average Q (with cost shock) - - 13.08 [0.49] 15.89 [0.55] 
Average Q (with no cost shock) - - 7.25 [0.30] 8.44 [0.44] 
Low quality (accepted offers) 13 (14.3%) 63 (16.7%) 20 (6.3%) 50 (11.8%) 
Normal quality (accepted offers) 33 (36.3%) 124 (32.9%) 61 (19.4%) 85 (20.1%) 
High quality (accepted offers) 45 (49.5%) 190 (50.4%) 234 (74.3%) 287 (68.0%) 
Avg. quality (accepted offers) 0.35 [0.08] 0.34 [0.04] 0.68 [0.03] 0.56 [0.03] 
Avg. buyer earnings (all offers) 12.66 [0.99] 12.61 [0.54] 17.02 [0.56] 16.58 [0.49] 
Avg. buyer earnings (accepted offers) 14.34 [1.14] 13.84 [0.61] 17.48 [0.56] 17.07 [0.50] 
Avg. seller earnings (all offers) 16.68 [1.16] 17.50 [0.62] 20.95 [0.46] 19.03 [0.47] 
Avg. seller earnings (accepted offers) 19.25 [1.27] 19.52 [0.67] 21.56 [0.44] 19.63 [0.47] 
Avg. total earnings (all offers) 29.34 [1.72] 30.11 [0.84] 37.97 [0.84] 35.61 [0.78] 
Avg. total earnings (accepted offers) 33.59 [1.81] 33.36 [0.86] 39.03 [0.81] 36.70 [0.77] 
No contract was offered on some occasions. In the column for endogenous flexible contracts with chat, one case is 
exclude (when calculating prices, quality, and earnings) in which the buyer received an extremely large negative 
payoff. P refers to the initial (pre-cost-shock) price, while Q refers to the transfer added with flexible contracts after 
the cost shock. Standard errors are in brackets. 
 
4.2 Non-parametric tests 
 
A conservative testing philosophy treats each session as just one observation, so that 
there are only four observations for each treatment; the data for each session is presented in 
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Appendix B.10  
 
Earnings 
Considering first the no-communication treatment with rigid contracts and earnings over 
all offers, two-tailed Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests show no significant differences for 
endogenous and exogenous rigid contracts (p = 0.886 for buyer earnings, 0.343 for seller 
earnings, and 0.486 for total earnings).  With no communication and flexible contracts, these 
tests find a significant difference only for seller earnings (p = 0.486 for buyer earnings, 0.057 for 
seller earnings, and 0.200 for total earnings); this difference reflects lower earnings from the 
endogenous treatment for sellers with flexible contracts. 
For the chat treatment, two-tailed Wilcoxon tests show no difference at all across 
endogenous and exogenous rigid contracts (again, p = 0.886 for buyer earnings, 0.886 for seller 
earnings, and 0.686 for total earnings).  The same test across flexible contracts finds a significant 
difference only for seller earnings (p = 0.886 for buyer earnings, 0.057 for seller earnings, and 
0.486 for total earnings) and a modest one for total earnings, both differences in favor of higher 
earnings with endogenous flexible contracts.  That is, the impact of selection effects appears to 
be limited to seller earnings with flexible contracts.  Endogeneity appears to have negative 
selection effects in the no-communication case and positive effects in the chat environment. 
  
Quality     
Results on tests for quality differences are broadly similar to those for earnings, and even 
more encouraging, since there are no significant differences between exogenous and endogenous 
designs, as we now detail.  In the treatments with no communication and rigid contracts, two-																																																								
10 We forego the more powerful but less pure statistical approach of using individual-level data.  It is less pure 
because subjects within sessions interact and can influence each other over multiple periods, so that individual 
trading pair outcomes are definitely not independent of other pairs.  
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tailed tests data find no significant difference in quality across endogenous and exogenous 
accepted contracts (quality is only observed after acceptance), with p = 0.886.  Quality appears to 
be higher with exogenous flexible contracts given no communication but this is not significant (p 
= 0.200).   Similarly, in the chat treatments, there is no significant difference in quality across 
endogenous and exogenous rigid accepted contracts (p = 0.343), and no such quality difference 
for accepted flexible contracts either (p = 0. 686).    
 
Total transfers 
The total transfer paid in (accepted) contracts is another indicator for differences between 
endogenous and exogenous contracts.  In the no-communication scenario, there is no difference 
between endogenous and exogenous for either rigid or flexible contracts (p = 1.000 and p = 
0.114, respectively) but for flexible contracts, exogeneity is almost significantly associated with 
higher total transfers, as is consistent with the higher seller earnings.  With chat, there is also no 
difference for rigid contracts (p = 0.886), but again there is a significant difference for flexible 
contracts (p = 0.029) only now in the opposite direction: higher total transfers under endogeneity. 
In sum, the differences are minimal and limited to the following exceptions: total 
transfers and seller earnings are both higher under endogeneity in the chat treatment and the 
converse effect arises in the no-communication treatment, though seller earnings do not quite 
differ significantly there.  Clearly, the total transfer rise fits well with the higher seller earnings.11   
But why might buyer transfer choices vary in this way with endogeneity?  We discuss this in the 
conclusion after first corroborating these patterns in a regression analysis. 
 
4.3 Regression analysis  																																																								11	That quality, while moving in parallel with the transfer shifts, does not do so significantly, most likely reflects the 
low magnitude of the transfer effects.	
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In this section, we study the effects of the treatments using simple regression analysis. 
The results essentially confirm the non-parametric tests reported above. The coefficients and 
standard errors from pairwise regressions (clustered at the session level) across endogenous and 
exogenous contracts are shown in Table 3.  
 We regress the relevant outcome variables on a dummy for exogeneity of the contract 
form.  The regressions show that there are few significant differences from changing the 
endogeneity of contract form. As in the non-parametric tests, the exceptions relate to flexible 
contracts so we focus on flexible contracts.  Without communication, there are mildly significant 
differences in quality and total transfers in favor of exogenous contracts when there is no 
communication (and a marginally-significant difference in total earnings).  By contrast, with chat 
this is rather different.  Now total transfers and seller earnings are significantly higher with 
endogenous contracts.   
Table 3: Comparisons across treatments, Random-effects regressions 
Comparison (1) 
Buyer 
Earnings 
(2) 
Seller 
Earnings 
(3) 
Total 
Earnings 
(4) 
Quality 
(5) 
Total 
Transfer 
Rigid, no chat -0.468 
(1.254) 
2.122 
(1.424) 
1.697 
(1.382) 
0.016 
(0.064) 
0.515 
(1.296) 
Flex, no chat 0.489 
(1.015) 
3.665*** 
(1.512) 
4.173* 
(2.322) 
0.150* 
(0.079) 
2.672** 
(1.066) 
Rigid, chat  0.306 
(1.485) 
1.299 
(2.526) 
1.544 
(3.223) 
0.044 
(0.130) 
1.020 
(2.204) 
Flex, chat -0.224 
(1.321) 
-1.878*** 
(0.568) 
-2.141 
(1.684) 
-0.115* 
(0.068) 
-1.638*** 
(0.380) 
Entries are coefficients from GLS regressions.  Standard errors are in parentheses. Earnings 
regressions use all contract offers, while quality is only given for trade acceptance and total 
transfer uses only accepted contracts.  ***, **, and * indicate significance at p = 0.01, 0.05,  
and 0.10 (two-tailed tests), respectively.  One case with an extreme buyer loss and seller gain  
is excluded.  Clustering is at the session level.  Positive coefficients reflect higher values in  
the exogenous treatments. 
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5. Discussion & Conclusion 
Previous literature in this area has largely ignored the issue of potential selection effects 
when a contract choice is endogenous.  If one is interested only in the overall behavior of 
participants in an endogenous setting, and one believes that selection effects are small and choice 
of contract form per se has limited direct effects (say, because the relevant actors have 
substantial discretion either way), then this is not unreasonable.  But for a more careful test of the 
performance of contracts per se, one needs to utilize contracts that have been imposed by an 
external entity to avoid the influence of any selection effects.  The main focus of BCE is on the 
effect of communication on behavior with endogenous contracts.  In this paper, we instead 
consider whether there are differences across contracts types that are chosen by a party to the 
contract or selected by the experimenter.   
We see that by and large there are few differences across behavior with respect to the 
source of a particular contract type.  The primary patterns in BCE survive with exogenous 
contracts.  This is really good news for the studies that have ignored this issue, since their 
findings regarding the performance of contract types do not have to be discarded. 
Nevertheless, there are some rather modest differences across endogenous and exogenous 
contracts.  There is no significant difference in this respect for rigid contracts (either with or 
without chat), but there are some differences with flexible contracts.  Specifically, without 
communication, sellers have higher earnings when flexible contracts are exogenously determined 
and this effect is reversed with chat, sellers have higher earnings in the endogenous 
case.  Coinciding intuitively with this pattern, transfers (price paid) from buyer to seller are 
higher with flexible exogenous contracts without communication, but are lower with flexible 
endogenous contracts.   
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We interpret the higher transfer and seller earnings under endogenous flexible contracts 
in the chat treatment via how sellers’ use the chat.  Sellers typically encourage buyers to pay 
higher transfers and to choose flexible (in order to share in their cost).  We already argued 
against the typical channel for selection effects based on heterogeneity in distributive social 
preferences, but there is a subtler possibility.  Buyers may be heterogenous in their 
responsiveness to seller pressure and sellers may differ in their persuasiveness.  In chat 
treatments where sellers influence buyers, we can expect both higher transfers, and under 
endogeneity, more flexible choices.  So endogenous flexible will feature higher transfers and 
therefore higher seller earnings than do exogenous flexible contracts.   
In the case without chat, endogenous flexible may be associated with lower transfers 
because endogeneity makes buyers feel more powerful and more deserving, but we argued above 
that such direct procedural effects are not likely given the buyer always has substantial 
discretionary powers.  Perhaps a more plausible explanation is that the type of buyer who selects 
flexible contracting under no-communication underestimates sellers’ negative reaction to 
ambiguity and also to low transfers. If so, the buyers using flexible contracts in the endogenous, 
no-communication treatment are also the type of buyers who are likely to set transfers too low. 
Notice that the BCE design does not preclude all distributional-preference-based 
selection and signaling effects.  It is just that such effects are more complicated since they 
necessarily operate through attitudes to the distribution of payoff uncertainty and not just of 
payoff levels.  Moreover, it is not easy to come up with plausible selection stories that fit the 
endogeneity effects in our data.  For instance, buyers may differ in their concern for sharing in 
the seller's cost uncertainty and we might expect these sharing types of buyer to also be more 
generous.  But this would predict higher not lower total transfers in the no-communication 
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treatments for those buyers who choose flexible (in order to share), compared to those assigned 
flexible. 
One might conceivably argue that those buyers who want to share in the no-
communication treatment are actually meaner types who only pick flexible because they believe 
sharing will earn them an insurance premium, or who plan to trick sellers by paying no 
additional transfer despite their flexible choice.  These explanations might work, but are rather 
complicated.  To build a story to the results with chat as well, it is necessary to add a twist.  For 
instance, if, with no-communication, many buyers, even pro-social ones, do not care for the 
seller, then chat can moderate the selection effect and potentially fit our data. 
The main point, however, is that the selection effects are limited to these two factors and 
relatively small in magnitude.   
Regarding the apparent limited presence of direct procedural effects, it is valuable to 
understand why we get different results to the papers discussed above in which the act of choice 
seems to directly motivate subjects to behave more responsibly.  Notice that those papers share a 
common feature: their exogenous or assignment treatments leave the subjects with no choice at 
all over the initiating contract, be it a background institution or a team structure or an incentive 
contract.  Since this decision is made ex-ante, we can say that the subjects have either zero or 
non-trivial ex-ante discretion.  By contrast, in BCE, the buyer always chooses whether to offer a 
contract and what price to propose, even in treatments where the contract form is exogenously 
assigned.  So the buyer participates actively in contract formation in either case.12 
BCE’s design avoids placing subjects into the extreme of complete non-
involvement.  This is appropriate for settings where relevant policy adjustments have only a 																																																								
12 Seller participation is always limited to accepting or rejecting, with the added possibility of trying to influence the 
buyer in the chat treatments. 
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limited effect on an agent’s degree of discretion.  It matters because in such settings, subjects’ 
psychological or ethical perception of self-control is unlikely to be affected by whether a specific 
policy option is assigned or chosen, so direct effects of endogeneity become less 
probable.  However, an experimental design that, in the aim of simplicity, abstracts from all 
other areas of agent discretion may fail to represent this situation, artificially turning the 
assignment treatment into an extreme of zero ex-ante discretion. 
The issue of endogenous choice has important ramifications for contracts and the design 
of effective institutions.  As there has really been very little work in this area, it will take a 
number of further studies before empirical regularities can be established.  
.  
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Online Appendix A: Instructions 
 
  
Thanks for coming to the experiment. You will receive 8 Euro for having shown up on 
time. In addition you will make money during the session. 
 
 The participants have been randomly divided into two roles – agents A and agents B – 
according to the seat number. These roles will remain constant during the whole experiment. 
 
 The experiment will have 11 periods. In each period you will be matched with another 
person in the other role. This person will change from period to period and you will never be 
paired twice with the same person. At no point will you know with whom you are matched. 
 
 Each period is independent and develops as follows. Agent A and agent B each has an 
endowment of 5 monetary units and an opportunity to interact. To interact with B, A has to 
propose a contract type (I or II) and a transfer, P, and B must accept this; all this occurs before 
knowing whether B’s cost is high (20) or low (0). After observing this cost (and if A and B 
agreed to interact), agent A can make an additional transfer, Q, but only if the negotiated contract 
is of type II. If, by contrast, the negotiated contract is of type I, the transfer remains fixed at P. 
After observing the cost and agent A’s final transfer (P or P+Q), agent B chooses his/her 
response R between the values  -1, 0 and 1, where R = -1 or R = 1 imply an additional cost of 1 
on B relative to R = 0. This response affects what agent A receives as explained below. In fuller 
detail, each period contains 5 stages: 
 
• Stage 1: Agent A proposes to agent B: 
 
 a contract of type I with a non-negative transfer P(I) 
   --or-- 
 a contract of type II with a non-negative transfer of P(II) (the initial transfer) 
 
• Stage 2: Agent B accepts or rejects this proposal. 
 If agent B rejects, then the period ends without the following steps. 
 If agent B accepts, then the period proceeds to step 3. 
 
• Stage 3: The cost of agent B is randomly determined by the computer. With probability ½ the 
cost is 0 and with probability ½ the cost is 20. 
 
• Stage 4: If a contract of type II is agreed, then agent A can now increase the initial transfer with 
an additional non-negative transfer Q (that is, can make a total transfer of P+Q instead of P). 
 
• Stage 5: Agent B chooses a response level R = -1, R = 0 or R = 1. 
(Notes	 to	 reader:	 the	 only	 difference	 between	 the	 chat	 and	 no-communication	treatments	is	the	presence	of	the	paragraph	on	communication;	the	exogenous-contract	and	 restricted-communication	 treatments	 are	 identical	 but	 for	 the	 minor	 changes	indicated	 in	 section	 3;	 we	 relabeled	 quality	 x	 as	 response	 R	 to	 maintain	 normal	language.)	
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 At each stage, agent A and agent B are both directly informed of what happened in all 
earlier stages (of that period). 
 
At the end of a period, the results are as follows: 
 
If agent B rejects the contract proposed by agent A: 
 Agent A and agent B each receive their initial endowment of 5 units. 
If agent B accepts: 
 Agent A receives: 15 + 0 (if R=-1)+ 20 (if R=0)+ 35(if R=1) – transfer_from_A_to_B. 
 Agent B receives 5 – cost – |R| + transfer_from_A_to_B. 
  where the cost is = 0 or 20, depending on the outcome given by the computer, 
  and the transfer from A to B = P(I)  if the contract is of type I, and 
               = P(II) + Q  if the contract if of type II. 
 
After this we will proceed to the next period which will develop in the same way. Remember that 
you will never play the same person twice. 
 
The first period, called period 0, will be a trial period and will not be taken into account in 
determining what you will earn in the experiment. Periods 1 to 10 will not be trial periods. One 
of these will be randomly selected to determine what you earn in the experiment. 
 
Each monetary unit is worth 1 Euro. At the end of the session you will be paid 8 Euros plus what 
you will have earned in the period that is selected randomly. 
 
 
 
You can ask questions at any time. If you have a question, raise your hand and one of us will 
come to your cubicle to answer it. 
 
Now we will briefly explain the screens that you will see once the experiment starts. 
 
 
Communication: During each period, the agents A and B, can communicate through a chat. 
To do this, they have to write a message in the appropriate field and push “ENTER”. Each 
participant A and B can close his/her chat window and can open it again after having closed it 
(all previous messages of the period will remain visible). While one participant has his chat 
window closed, he/she will not be able to read or send messages, but the participant he is 
matched with will continue to be able to send messages (which will be visible for the matched 
person once he/she reopens the chat window). 
It is important not to use the chat window to send messages that reveal your identity. 
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Online Appendix B: Session-level data 
Table B1: Behavior in session 1 of the endogenous no-communication treatment 
Category Rigid contract Flexible contract 
Frequency* 53 (49.5%) 56 (50.5%) 
Rejections 12 (25.9%) 11 (20.0%) 
Average P 15.15 [1.07] 13.00 [0.83] 
Average Q - 2.44  [0.58] 
Low quality 10 (22.5%) 12 (27.9%) 
Normal quality 25 (65.0%) 30 (9.8%) 
High quality 5 (12.5%) 1 (2.3%) 
Avg. quality -0.10 (0.09) -0.26 (0.09) 
Avg. buyer earnings (all offers) 12.08 [1.41] 11.00 [1.20] 
Avg. seller earnings (all offers) 9.62 [1.48] 10.56 [1.68] 
Avg. total earnings (all offers) 21.70 [1.83] 20.21 [1.82] 
* No contract was offered on one occasion. Standard errors are in brackets. 
 
Table B2: Behavior in session 2 of the endogenous no-communication treatment 
Category Rigid contract Flexible contract 
Frequency* 66 (60.0%) 44 (40.0%) 
Rejections 24 (36.3%) 23 (52.3%) 
Average P 14.18 [0.61] 10.00 [0.55] 
Average Q - 1.78 [0.83] 
Low quality 14 (33.3%) 8 (38.1%) 
Normal quality 27 (64.3%) 13 (61.9%) 
High quality 1 (2.4%) 0 (0.0%) 
Avg. quality -0.31 (0.08) -0.44 (0.12) 
Avg. buyer earnings (all offers) 9.86 [1.07] 8.55 [1.32] 
Avg. seller earnings (all offers) 8.92 [1.12] 4.00 [0.92] 
Avg. total earnings (all offers) 18.79 [1.74] 12.55 [1.45] 
 
Standard errors are in brackets.	 	
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Table B3: Behavior in session 3 of the endogenous no-communication treatment 
Category Rigid contract Flexible contract 
Frequency 46 (41.8%) 64 (58.2%) 
Rejections 11 (23.9%) 15 (23.4%) 
Average P 12.93 [0.88] 10.66 [0.48] 
Average Q - 2.78 [0.44] 
Low quality 9 (25.7%) 22 (44.9%) 
Normal quality 26 (74.3%) 26 (53.1%) 
High quality 0 (0.0%) 1 (2.0%) 
Avg. quality -0.26 [0.07] -0.43 [0.08] 
Avg. buyer earnings (all offers) 12.61 [1.35] 10.34 [1.19] 
Avg. seller earnings (all offers) 7.41 [1.32] 6.88 [1.20] 
Avg. total earnings (all offers) 20.02 [2.13] 17.22 [1.86] 
Standard errors are in brackets. 
 
Table B4: Behavior in session 4 of the endogenous no-communication treatment 
Category Rigid contract Flexible contract 
Frequency 78 (71.6%) 32 (28.4%) 
Rejections 31 (39.7%) 11 (35.5%) 
Average P 11.45 [0.76] 10.35 [1.19] 
Average Q - 3.45 [0.72] 
Low quality 18 (38.3%) 11 (55.0%) 
Normal quality 29 (61.7%) 7 (35.0%) 
High quality 0 (0.0%) 2 (10.0%) 
Avg. quality -0.38 (0.07) -0.43 (0.15) 
Avg. buyer earnings (all offers) 9.65 [0.95] 7.84 [1.28] 
Avg. seller earnings (all offers) 5.88 [0.92] 7.23 [1.89] 
Avg. total earnings (all offers) 15.54 [1.47] 15.06 [2.82] 
^We exclude one case in which the buyer received a very large 
negative payoff in the final period. Standard errors are in brackets. 	
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Table B5: Behavior in session 1 of the endogenous chat treatment 
Category Rigid contract Flexible contract 
Frequency 29 (26.4%) 81 (73.6%) 
Rejections 9 (23.7%) 4 (4.7%) 
Average P 19.41 [1.76] 17.37 [0.84] 
Average Q - 9.29 [0.86] 
Low quality 6 (30.0%) 8 (10.4%) 
Normal quality 3 (15.0%) 15 (19.5%) 
High quality 11 (55.0%) 54 (70.1%) 
Avg. quality 0.25 [0.20] 0.60 [0.08] 
Avg. buyer earnings (all offers) 10.83 [0.58] 15.59 [1.45] 
Avg. seller earnings (all offers) 16.00 [2.03] 21.54 [0.93] 
Avg. total earnings (all offers) 26.83 [3.62] 37.14 [1.94] 
Standard errors are in brackets. 
 
Table B6: Behavior in session 2 of the endogenous chat treatment 
Category Rigid contract Flexible contract 
Frequency* 12 (11.1%) 96 (88.9%) 
Rejections 6 (50.0%) 2 (2.0%) 
Average P 13.42 [2.28] 10.92 [0.97] 
Average Q - 15.74 [1.02] 
Low quality 0 (0.0%) 5 (5.3%) 
Normal quality 4 (66.7%) 17 (18.1%) 
High quality 2 (33.3%) 72 (76.6%) 
Avg. quality 0.33 [0.21] 0.71 [0.06] 
Avg. buyer earnings (all offers) 14.42 [3.63] 18.39 [0.79] 
Avg. seller earnings (all offers) 7.92 [3.78] 20.81 [0.95] 
Avg. total earnings (all offers) 22.33 [4.51] 39.20 [1.44] 
* No contract was offered on two occasions. Standard errors are in brackets. 	 	
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Table B7: Behavior in session 3 of the endogenous chat treatment 
Category Rigid contract Flexible contract 
Frequency 53 (48.2%) 57 (51.8%) 
Rejections 3 (5.7%) 6 (10.5%) 
Average P 25.91 [0.85] 19.23 [1.04] 
Average Q - 7.92 [1.17] 
Low quality 3 (6.0%) 4 (7.8%) 
Normal quality 21 (42.0%) 15 (29.4%) 
High quality 26 (52.0%) 32 (62.8%) 
Avg. quality 0.46 [0.09] 0.55 [0.09] 
Avg. buyer earnings (all offers) 14.47 [1.24] 13.86 [1.41] 
Avg. seller earnings (all offers) 18.94 [1.69] 19.19 [1.23] 
Avg. total earnings (all offers) 33.42 [2.37] 33.05 [2.19] 
Standard errors are in brackets. 
 
Table B8: Behavior in session 4 of the endogenous chat treatment 
Category Rigid contract Flexible contract 
Frequency 15 (15.4%) 93 (84.6%) 
Rejections 2 (11.8%) 0 (0.0%) 
Average P 25.24 [2.08] 21.30 [0.32] 
Average Q - 6.52 [0.58] 
Low quality 4 (26.7%) 3 (3.2%) 
Normal quality 5 (33.3%) 14 (15.1%) 
High quality 6 (40.0%) 76 (81.7%) 
Avg. quality 0.13 [0.22] 0.78 [0.05] 
Avg. buyer earnings (all offers) 8.88 [2.59] 18.80 [0.86] 
Avg. seller earnings (all offers) 17.00 [1.16] 21.65 [2.80] 
Avg. total earnings (all offers) 25.88 [4.39] 40.44 [1.27] 
Standard errors are in brackets. 
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Table B9: Behavior in session 1 of the exogenous rigid no-communication treatment 
Category Rigid contract 
Frequency* 109 (100%) 
Rejections 36 (33.0%) 
Average P 14.09 [0.62] 
Average Q - 
Low quality 29 (39.7%) 
Normal quality 41 (56.2%) 
High quality 3 (4.1%) 
Avg. quality -0.36 [0.07] 
Avg. buyer earnings (all offers) 7.13 [0.90] 
Avg. seller earnings (all offers) 13.08 [1.17] 
Avg. total earnings (all offers) 20.21 [1.48] 
* No contract was offered on one occasion. Standard errors are in brackets. 
 
Table B10: Behavior in session 2 of the exogenous rigid no-communication treatment 
Category Rigid contract 
Frequency* 107 (100%) 
Rejections 40 (37.4%) 
Average P 14.07 [0.57] 
Average Q - 
Low quality 18 (26.9%) 
Normal quality 44 (65.7%) 
High quality 5 (7.5%) 
Avg. quality -0.19 [0.07] 
Avg. buyer earnings (all offers) 12.11 [0.96] 
Avg. seller earnings (all offers) 7.36 [0.79] 
Avg. total earnings (all offers) 19.47 [1.34] 
* No contract was offered on three occasions. Standard errors are in brackets. 
 
		 31	
Table B11: Behavior in session 3 of the exogenous rigid no-communication treatment 
Category Rigid contract 
Frequency 110 (100%) 
Rejections 29 (26.4%) 
Average P 16.53 [0.45] 
Average Q - 
Low quality 23 (28.4%) 
Normal quality 52 (64.2%) 
High quality 6 (7.4%) 
Avg. quality -0.21 [0.06] 
Avg. buyer earnings (all offers) 11.55 [0.94] 
Avg. seller earnings (all offers) 10.55 [0.90] 
Avg. total earnings (all offers) 22.10 [1.40] 
Standard errors are in brackets. 
 	
Table B12: Behavior in session 4 of the exogenous rigid no-communication treatment 
Category Rigid contract 
Frequency 110 (100%) 
Rejections 47 (42.7%) 
Average P 14.62 [0.40] 
Average Q - 
Low quality 16 (25.4%) 
Normal quality 46 (73.0%) 
High quality 1 (1.6%) 
Avg. quality -0.24 [0.06] 
Avg. buyer earnings (all offers) 11.04 [0.86] 
Avg. seller earnings (all offers) 8.67 [0.81] 
Avg. total earnings (all offers) 19.71 [1.28] 
Standard errors are in brackets. 
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Table B13: Behavior in session 1 of the exogenous flex no-communication treatment 
Category Flexible contract 
Frequency* 109 (100%) 
Rejections 33 (30.3%) 
Average P 15.17 [0.76] 
Average Q 3.62 [0.50] 
Low quality 26 (34.2%) 
Normal quality 41 (54.0%) 
High quality 9 (11.8%) 
Avg. quality -0.22 [0.07] 
Avg. buyer earnings (all offers) 9.25 [0.96] 
Avg. seller earnings (all offers) 10.75 [1.09] 
Avg. total earnings (all offers) 20.00 [1.59] 
• No contract was offered on one occasion. Standard errors are in brackets. 
 
Table B14: Behavior in session 2 of the exogenous flex no-communication treatment 
Category Flexible contract 
Frequency 110 (100%) 
Rejections 40 (36.4%) 
Average P 13.57 [0.63] 
Average Q 3.30 [0.76] 
Low quality 33 (47.1%) 
Normal quality 31 (44.3%) 
High quality 6 (8.6%) 
Avg. quality -0.39 [0.08] 
Avg. buyer earnings (all offers) 8.17 [0.90] 
Avg. seller earnings (all offers) 8.11 [0.93] 
Avg. total earnings (all offers) 16.28 [1.40] 
Standard errors are in brackets. 
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Table B15: Behavior in session 3 of the exogenous flex no-communication treatment 
Category Flexible contract 
Frequency 110 (100%) 
Rejections 26 (39.7%) 
Average P 14.48[0.63] 
Average Q 4.88 [1.12] 
Low quality 20 (23.8%) 
Normal quality 50 (59.5%) 
High quality 14 (16.7%) 
Avg. quality -0.07 [0.07] 
Avg. buyer earnings (all offers) 11.40 [1.02] 
Avg. seller earnings (all offers) 13.84 [1.33] 
Avg. total earnings (all offers) 25.24 [1.63] 
Standard errors are in brackets. 
 
Table B16: Behavior in session 4 of the exogenous flex no-communication treatment 
Category Rigid contract 
Frequency 110 (100%) 
Rejections 21 (19.1%) 
Average P 12.37 [0.47] 
Average Q 2.90 (0.41) 
Low quality 29 (32.6%) 
Normal quality 52 (58.4%) 
High quality 8 (9.0%) 
Average quality -0.24 [0.06] 
Avg. buyer earnings (all offers) 9.67 [1.10] 
Avg. seller earnings (all offers) 11.72 [0.87] 
Avg. total earnings (all offers) 21.39 [1.56] 
Standard errors are in brackets. 
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Table B17: Behavior in session 1 of the exogenous rigid chat treatment 
Category Rigid contract 
Frequency 110 (100%) 
Rejections 12(10.9%) 
Average P 27.37 [0.81] 
Average Q - 
Low quality 4 (4.1%) 
Normal quality 30 (30.6%) 
High quality 64 (65.3%) 
Avg. quality 0.61 [0.06] 
Avg. buyer earnings (all offers) 13.03 [0.85] 
Avg. seller earnings (all offers) 22.35 [1.11] 
Avg. total earnings (all offers) 35.38 [1.38] 
Standard errors are in brackets. 
 
Table B18: Behavior in session 2 of the exogenous rigid chat treatment 
Category Rigid contract 
Frequency 110 (100%) 
Rejections 15 (13.6%) 
Average P 23.28[0.68] 
Average Q - 
Low quality 14 (14.7%) 
Normal quality 25 (26.3%) 
High quality 56 (58.9%) 
Avg. quality 0.44 [0.08] 
Avg. buyer earnings (all offers) 14.11 [1.13] 
Avg. seller earnings (all offers) 18.80 [1.10] 
Avg. total earnings (all offers) 32.91 [1.69] 
Standard errors are in brackets. 
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Table B19: Behavior in session 3 of the exogenous rigid chat treatment 
Category Rigid contract 
Frequency 110 (100%) 
Rejections 22 (20.0%) 
Average P 21.17[1.20] 
Average Q - 
Low quality 24 (27.3%) 
Normal quality 29 (32.9%) 
High quality 35 (39.8%) 
Avg. quality 0.12 [0.09] 
Avg. buyer earnings (all offers) 9.84 [1.18] 
Avg. seller earnings (all offers) 15.67 [1.40] 
Avg. total earnings (all offers) 25.51 [1.68] 
Standard errors are in brackets. 
 
Table B20: Behavior in session 4 of the exogenous rigid chat treatment 
Category Rigid contract 
Frequency 110 (100%) 
Rejections 14 (12.7%) 
Average P 19.91 [0.78] 
Average Q - 
Low quality 21 (21.9%) 
Normal quality 40 (41.7%) 
High quality 35 (36.5%) 
Avg. quality 0.15 [0.08] 
Avg. buyer earnings (all offers) 13.33 [1.10] 
Avg. seller earnings (all offers) 12.94 [1.16] 
Avg. total earnings (all offers) 26.26 [1.72] 
Standard errors are in brackets. 
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Table B21: Behavior in session 1 of the exogenous flex chat treatment 
Category Flexible contract 
Frequency 110 (100%) 
Rejections 4 (3.6%) 
Average P 13.98 [0.57] 
Average Q 12.05 (0.76) 
Low quality 7 (6.6%) 
Normal quality 20 (18.9%) 
High quality 79 (74.5%) 
Avg. quality 0.68 [0.06] 
Avg. buyer earnings (all offers) 18.04[0.82] 
Avg. seller earnings (all offers) 19.95 [0.88] 
Avg. total earnings (all offers) 37.99 [1.44] 
Standard errors are in brackets. 
 
 
Table B22: Behavior in session 2 of the exogenous flex chat treatment 
Category Flexible contract 
Frequency 110 (100%) 
Rejections 4 (3.6%) 
Average P 14.74 [0.60] 
Average Q 9.88 [0.76] 
Low quality 9 (8.5%) 
Normal quality 24 (22.6%) 
High quality 73 (68.9%) 
Avg. quality 0.60 [0.06] 
Avg. buyer earnings (all offers) 18.19 [0.92] 
Avg. seller earnings (all offers) 18.84 [0.92] 
Avg. total earnings (all offers) 37.03 [1.47] 
Standard errors are in brackets. 
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Table B23: Behavior in session 3 of the exogenous flex chat treatment 
Category Flexible contract 
Frequency 110 (100%) 
Rejections 5 (4.6%) 
Average P 10.64[0.63] 
Average Q 15.05 [0.83] 
Low quality 18 (17.1%) 
Normal quality 12 (11.4%) 
High quality 75 (71.4%) 
Avg. quality 0.54 [0.08] 
Avg. buyer earnings (all offers) 15.87 [0.99] 
Avg. seller earnings (all offers) 18.15 [0.95] 
Avg. total earnings (all offers) 34.02 [1.61] 
Standard errors are in brackets. 
 
Table B24: Behavior in session 4 of the exogenous flex chat treatment 
Category Flexible contract 
Frequency 110 (100%) 
Rejections 5 (4.6%) 
Average P 13.21 [0.58] 
Average Q 12.21 [0.77] 
Low quality 17 (16.2%) 
Normal quality 29 (27.6%) 
High quality 59 (56.2%) 
Avg. quality 0.42 [0.07] 
Avg. buyer earnings (all offers) 13.98 [1.14] 
Avg. seller earnings (all offers) 19.11 [1.03] 
Avg. total earnings (all offers) 33.08 [1.71] 
Standard errors are in brackets. 
 	
